T his article considers how organizational leaders can use human capital to gain competitive advantage. 1 It also draws on research in strategic implementation and organizational change to illustrate how organizations need to adjust to changed market conditions if they are to continue to grow and be successful over time. 2 Cisco is not simply investing in developing the next generation of leaders because it is a nice thing to do, but rather because Cisco's ability to execute its strategy in a vastly different competitive environment depends critically on developing leaders who have a different skill set and who embrace a different organizational culture than the previous generation. 3 Cisco's experience illustrates the challenges leaders face as organizational life cycles evolve and require managers to develop new capabilities. 4 The new competitive environment requires that Cisco learn to leverage scale and efficiency rather than unbridled growth. Although different in specifics, these are the challenges that almost all successful organizations will face in their evolution. The lessons from Cisco provide a template that other leaders can use in managing organizations through various stages of evolution and different types of growth. " Cisco could be a case study of how a sullied high-flyer can use a slump not only to clean house, but also to build a better foundation." -Peter Burrows, Business Week, November 24, 2003 "In the end, you might just have speed, talent, and branding. Those things may be the only differentiators."-John Chambers, Business Week, August 28, 2000 The late 1990s were a boom time for Silicon Valley companies and one of the stars was Cisco Systems-the leader in hardware and software technology for routing traffic on the Internet and on corporate networks. For a short time in early 2000, Cisco's market capitalization of $550 billion made it the most valuable company in the world. Cisco's growth during this period was breathtaking. Between 1995 and 2000, revenue grew at an average of 53 percent annually and the company employed more than 500 recruiters and regularly added 1,000 new employees each month. Between mid-1999 and late 2000, Cisco doubled the size of its workforce to more than 44,000 employees.
While the sheer logistics of this effort were significant, Cisco's deeper challenge was to acquire the management talent needed to handle this growth. One of Cisco's solutions was their acquisition strategy. From 1993 through 2000, Cisco acquired 70 companies. These acquisitions provided not only technology, but also served as a source of some of the management talent needed to run the company. Cisco not only liked to hire people through acquisitions, but also from their competitors. While the hyper-growth presented many challenges, gaining career opportunities within Cisco was not one of them. This "buy" approach to people development provided Cisco with talented people and employees with opportunities to prove their worth and to be promoted.
With this "buy" strategy, however, management development occurred through trial-by-fire, as people were given greater responsibilities at an unrelenting pace. Mohsen Moazami, Vice President of the Internet Business Solutions Group, described this period as one of "scaling and speed-doubling and tripling and a run, run, run mentality.
No one had much focus on costs and ROI. Our job was just to get things done fast." Randy Pond, Senior Vice President of Operations, Processes, and Systems, who joined Cisco in 1993 as part of the Crescendo acquisition, acknowledged that prior to 2000, Cisco was "really pretty spotty at best in leadership development. It was left up to the individual." However, given Cisco's dominance, developing leadership talent was not a high priority. Inder Sidhu, Vice President of World Wide Sales Strategy, observed that selling during that period was like "picking diamonds up off the floor . . . there was so much opportunity that we were primarily focused on capturing it, rather than looking elegant doing it."
By the end of 2000, however, Cisco's financial performance had changed dramatically. For the first time in Cisco's history, revenue fell as the technology "boom" went "bust." By the summer of 2001, sales fell one-third from their level six months earlier and the stock price was down half from its peak, falling an unimaginable 68 percent in just 10 weeks. Moazami said: "It was as though someone came to Kraft Foods and said 'cheese causes cancer.'" Financial analysts and business journalists began to wonder if Cisco, without its ability to grow through acquisitions, could really continue to attract and retain people. Some worried about whether Cisco's culture, to which many people attributed Cisco's amazing growth in the 1990s, could survive since over half the employ-IBM. Chambers holds a law degree and a bachelor of science/bachelor of arts degree in business from West Virginia University. He later received a masters of business administration degree in finance and management from Indiana University. He is married and has two adult children.
Kate DCamp, Senior Vice President, Human Resources
Kate DCamp leads a global team of HR professionals charged with accelerating Cisco's evolution to a development culture that builds a sustainable supply of leadership and talent from within.
Since beginning in her leadership role in Cisco in May 2000, Kate and her team have developed and implemented new leadership processes and programs to develop the next generation of leaders, transitioning Cisco from a company that brought in talent through direct hiring and an aggressive acquisition strategy.The team is also taking Cisco from a leader in e-HR to the next level by creating efficient and effective business processes that utilize the full power of intelligent networks and the Internet and increase the return on investment in talent.
Kate has more than 20 years of human resources and business experience. Before joining Cisco, Kate served as Global Leader of Compensation and Executive Programs for GE Capital where she designed and managed the executive, compensation, and recognition related programs for the company's 130,000 employees and 28 businesses.
Prior to GE, Kate held several other Human Resource leadership roles, including Director of Executive Programs at The Associated Group in Indianapolis, where she led executive development and developed the annual business operating plan and metrics.While at The Associated Group, Kate developed a new compensation strategy for Anthem and a new compensation and governance model for the Acordia Companies as part of the plan for an IPO of this subsidiary business on the New York Stock Exchange.
Mary Eckenrod,Vice President,World Wide Talent Management
Mary Eckenrod is currently Vice President, World Wide Talent, for Cisco Systems, Inc., which she joined in June 2001. She is focused on accelerating the identification, assessment, and development of Cisco's top leadership talent. She also leads the company's talent resourcing, executive education and staffing, learning and development, university relations and campus recruiting, and performance management initiatives. Pond is on the Board of Directors for The Children's Discovery Museum of San Jose and Northwestern University. He has a bachelor's degree in accounting and economics from Ball State University in Indiana.
ees had been with the company less than 18 months. One journalist noted: "With workers from all its acquisitions roaming the halls, Cisco sometimes resembles a mini United Nations." 5 Another likened the culture to the bar scene from the movie, Star Wars. 6 In the spring of 2001, Cisco had to take a staggering $2.5 billion charge to write-down excess inventory and, for the first time in the company's history, Cisco cut its staff by 8,500 employees, nearly a fifth of its workforce. For John Chambers, the President and CEO, this was a traumatic event. Earlier in his career at Wang, he'd had to layoff employees and, at that time, he vowed to never do it again. In describing this period, Chambers talked about how his parents defined a "learning experience" as "something that was not going to be fun and that was going to last a long time." In his words, 2001 was a learning experience, but Chambers also claimed that, "it is tremendously important in building great companies." 7 After the downturn, Chambers began to talk more about Cisco being a company that could and should be considered to be "built to last." The implication, from a people standpoint, was to begin to put in place the processes to "build" talent within Cisco and not just buy it through acquisitions. Mary Eckenrod, Vice President of Worldwide Talent Management, reflected that along with this notion of building talent came an increased focus on the concept of a "career" with Cisco.
The early initiatives around leadership development began in June when Kate DCamp was appointed Senior Vice President of Human Resources. With encouragement from the Board of Directors, DCamp began to take the early steps to identify top talent at the company. Eckenrod was hired in June 2001 with the explicit purpose of focusing on the identification and acceleration of leadership talent. DCamp and Eckenrod sharpened the focus to include the first review of Cisco's leadership development strategy with the Cisco Board's Compensation and Management Committee in early 2002. At the same time, DCamp asked Eckenrod to broaden her responsibilities to include the on-boarding of leadership talent from campus recruiting to executive-level searches.
Together, DCamp and Eckenrod began a multi-year process of building a new generation of Cisco leaders. Their challenge was to create integrated processes and solutions that would uniquely support Cisco's culture and market. Given the pressure Cisco was facing both internally and externally, they knew they had to move quickly.
Cisco Background 8

Early History
Cisco was founded in 1984 by Leonard Bosack and Sandy Lerner, husband and wife academics at Stanford University who invented a technology to link their separate computer systems to send e-mail to each other; however, their departments were on two different operating systems that did not "talk" to each other. To remedy the situation, they built a router or a "translator" that acted like a mailroom, opening packets and distributing the data. The software allowed the data to be read by any kind of computer on the network, even across different operating systems. With venture funding form Don Valentine at Sequoia Capital and a new CEO in John Morgridge, Cisco went public in 1990.
Cisco began by offering high-end routers and competed primarily in the LAN (local area network) market, or the stand-alone boxes that scanned network traffic and sent it along to the proper address via the most-efficient, leastcongested network path. Because Cisco's routers could connect to any kind of computer from IBM to Apple to Unix machines, it allowed Cisco to enter corporate networks earlier than its competitors. In fact, because demand was so high and customers continuously wanted more speed, Cisco raced just to keep up with customer demand. One of the key challenges for Cisco throughout its history was that, in the computer networking business, the average product lifecycle was estimated to be a mere 18 months on the hardware side and 6 months on the software side. On top of that, the industry rule-of-thumb was that each new product solution should offer twice the speed at the same or less cost. Cisco's rule of thumb was to improve performance threefold and reduce cost in half every generation-a five-to six-fold improvement every 24 to 36 months. Thus speed to market became one of the company's driving strategies.
In 1993, Cisco changed its strategy and began to diversify into other network markets and technologies due to the changing face of the global Internet and corporate Intranet worlds. At that time, a new high-powered technology appeared called switches. Switches were less sophisticated than routers, but they performed many of the functions of more expensive routers. Thus Cisco simply bought the companies that made the products its customers needed such as Kalpana and Crescendo, beginning the company's aggressive acquisition strategy to acquire technology and talent.
As an early player in this fast-growing industry, Cisco quickly became the leader in the data networking equipment market-the "plumbing" of the Internet. By 1997, approximately 80 percent of the large-scale routers that powered the Internet were made by Cisco and the company focused on routers, LAN switches, and wide-area network (WAN) switches. 9 At that time, it also began expanding its product line to include other networking solutions, Internet appliances, and network management software. Despite the breadth of its product offerings, Cisco held the number one or number two positions in nearly every market in which it competed.
Strategy, Leadership, Core Values, and Cultural Principles
Cisco's mission was to "be the supplier of choice by leading all competitors in customer satisfaction, product leadership, market share, and profitability." Its business purpose was: "To shape the future of global networking by creating unprecedented opportunities and value for our customers, employees, partners, and investors." In Cisco's view, a global networked business was an enterprise of any size that strategically used information and communications to build a network of strong, interactive relationships with all its key constituencies. Cisco's goal was to provide solutions to all of these global networked businesses and achieve market domination as quickly as possible. 12 Although Chambers had an energetic style, he was often described as having the earnest energy of a country doctor-something both his parents were.
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John Morgridge, Chairman of Cisco, noted that frugality and customer advocacy were the two main themes emphasized in Cisco's culture. "The frugality was a result of how we were funded-we were funded by credit cards and a second mortgage. . . . that attribute has remained a cornerstone of our culture going forward even though we're a very large company now. The second aspect was the term coined by Sandy Lerner, called customer advocacy. She believed that it was important that someone within the company was an advocate for the customer in terms of his/her needs and requirements. And we've kept that as a principle tenet of how we deal with our customers on an ongoing business."
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Venture capitalist John Doerr said of Chambers: "John Chambers is the most customer-focused human being you will ever meet. He is relentless." 15 In fact, Chambers often spent 30 hours a week or more meeting with customers.
Employees were constantly reminded of Cisco's values. Each carried a badge that had the company's mission and values printed on one side and the key culture principles on the other side. The company's culture was based on the principles of "open communication, empowerment, trust, integrity, and giving back to the community," while "Customer Success" drove the entire organization.
Historical "Buy" Strategy
Aggressive Acquisitions Strategy
It was in the late 1990s that Cisco developed a reputation for its extremely aggressive acquisition strategy. From 1993 through 2000, Cisco completed more than 70 acquisitions and spent more than $18 billion acquiring nine companies in 1998 and 14 in 1999, an average of more than one acquisition per quarter over a five-year period. Cisco identified acquisition targets as engineering companies that were first or second in their respective markets. After an acquisition, Cisco incorporated the technology of the new company into its own and supplemented it with its own marketing and support expertise.
In many cases, the strategic acquisitions allowed Cisco to grow into several markets and to instantly become an important player. The danger, of course, was that the rapid acquisition strategy could potentially pose business process and operational challenges. Chambers said confidently, however: "We have it [acquisitions] down to a science. We could do 10 a month if we needed to." 16 Many in the industry who analyzed the typical failures of mergers and acquisitions, pointed to Cisco's pre-acquisition analysis and its focus on cultural fit of people to be key success factors. Mike Volpi, Senior Vice President of the Routing Technology Group, was the SVP of business development and alliances while Cisco actively engaged in its acquisition strategy: "Cisco's strategy can be boiled down to five things. We look at a company's vision, its short-term success with customers, its long-term strategy, the chemistry of the people with ours, and its geographic proximity." 17 Using its high stock price as currency, Cisco bought its way into the market to sell the super high-speed switches that customers such as AT&T and MCI needed to run their networks, thus competing with Lucent, Nortel, Siemens, and Alcatel. It also bought its way into the optical networking market (components for fiber optic communications equipment), dubbed the next high-speed frontier. Optical networking was predicted to replace the old-world copper-wire telecom infrastructure due to the increasing demands for bandwidth from Internet traffic. Mike Volpi clarified: "We still have R&D. About 70 percent of our products come internally."
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Recruiting through Acquisitions
Denise Peck, currently VP of marketing, elaborated on Cisco's fast-paced acquisitions culture for people: "When we were in hyper growth-mode, if you needed resources, you'd just get them. Time to market was everything." 19 Speed to market was important because Cisco's executives had made a decision to aggressively attempt to become the Microsoft and the IBM of networking. The top priority of Cisco HR in the 1990s was recruiting top talent to meet the needs of the company's fast growth. As Chambers said in 1997: "Cisco has an overall goal of getting the top 10 to 15 percent of people in our industry. Our philosophy is very simple-if you get the best people in the industry to fit into your culture and you motivate them properly, then you're going to be an industry leader."
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Recruiting the "Passive Job Seeker" Acquiring talent through acquisitions was simply one way of recruiting for Cisco. The company also targeted those it dubbed, "passive job seekers" or those who were happy and successful at the companies in which they currently worked. These employees were more difficult to lure, thus Cisco used creative strategies and tactics to recruit such employees. According to Workforce: "In an effort to lure star players from competitors, Cisco resorted to the sort of brash marketing tricks used to hawk "soft drinks and sneakers." To gain insight into the likes and dislikes of potential hires, the company held focus groups to learn what sorts of movies and web sites were favored by the best and brightest. Hoping for chance encounters with possible hires, recruiters frequented places such as garden shows and microbrewery festivals. The company even rigged its corporate web site to spot visitors from rival 3Com and greet them with a special page that said, 'Welcome to Cisco, would you like a job?'" 21 Cisco also realized that its web site received the heaviest traffic between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m., meaning that people were looking for new jobs on company time. Thus it created a profile that prospective job seekers would fill out and matched the job seeker's skills and interest to job openings. A program called the "Friends Program" was created to actively recruit job seekers who clicked on a "make friends @ Cisco" button. Cisco employees called such active job seekers and talked about their lives at Cisco. In 1997, Cisco received 100 to 150 requests each week from applicants wishing to be introduced to a "friend@Cisco" and approximately a third of new hires came from the program. Chambers claimed that approximately 60 percent of the people who joined Cisco did so because they had a friend working there already. Employees who referred new hires received cash awards and became eligible for other prizes.
Sidhu commented on the recruiting imbalances, however: "Historically, Cisco did not invest in college hires. We liked to recruit people from competitors, but this both helped and hurt us because we ended up with a disproportionate number of high performers versus strong leaders. Historically, we had so much growth that if you worked at Cisco, performing well relative to your current role was all that mattered. This 'sink or swim' mentality permeated the company in general and leadership development specifically. This mentality was appropriate for the early developmental stage that Cisco was in at the time-when the primary strategic challenge was the development and delivery of new products through our own sales force in the early 1990s, and then using indirect sales channels such as channel partners, value added resellers, and others after that."
Retaining New Hires
After the aggressive tactics to hire employees either through acquisitions or other means, Cisco worked hard and creatively to retain its employees. This was one of the company's key competitive advantages during the lucrative late 1990s, when everyone had a plethora of new opportunities at different companies. In fact, Cisco's attrition rate was only 6.3 percent in 1999 and never went above 7.3 percent in the 1990s. 22 These were remarkably low figures, especially during the heyday of the Internet where attrition rates went as high as 40 percent and averaged 30 percent industry-wide. In addition, by 1998, over 70 percent of the senior managers from acquired companies were still with Cisco. 23 Some of Cisco's retention tactics included putting executives' offices in the middle of floors so that regular employees could have the window areas. The company offered a state-of-the-art daycare center with "nanny cams" so that employees could check up on their children without leaving their desks. Chambers also personally supported efforts to help employees: "Once, when a Cisco worker's home burned down, the human resources department asked Chambers for permission to advance funds to the person until an insurance claim came through. The CEO's response: 'Double it.'" 24 New hires were also assigned "buddies" who offered them personalized attention and an insider's view into Cisco's value and culture. The company made sure that it quickly indoctrinated Cisco's values through new hire courses and quarterly "all hands" meetings. Cisco's reward systems were aligned with the company's strategy and values as well. All employees received stock options, with over 40 percent of all Cisco options in the hands of individual employees without managerial rank. Other rewards were smaller but still meaningful, such as a free dinner or cash bonuses of up to $5000, that could be approved in 24 hours, simply for working hard. Supervisors had such reward budgets and were strongly encouraged to distribute them. 
Troubling Times
Cisco continued its rapid growth through the 1990s until everything came to a halt at the end of 2000 when the market crashed and demand for technology substantially decreased. Chambers called the time period, a "100-year flood scenario." In early 2000, Chambers spoke of Cisco hitting $50 billion in revenue and potentially reaching a market capitalization of $1 trillion. 25 The company never even came near to such optimistic figures. Instead, Cisco went from a $1.36 billion net income in the first quarter of fiscal year 2001 (up 70 percent from a year earlier) on sales of $6.52 billion (up 66 percent from a year earlier) to a $2.69 billion net loss for the third quarter of the same year, with charges of $2.2 billion for writing down excess inventory. Revenue was $4.73 billion, down 30 percent from the previous quarter and 4 percent year-over-year. In April 2001, the announcement to cut 8,500 jobs occurred. countered: "If a company has grown 30 to 50 percent, and on the higher end of that range for the past 10 years . . . if each time a hesitation occurs in the market, and the company pulls back on inventory and does not have an aggressive acquisition strategy, then you can't be the major company we are today. We take calculated risks and we're not going to change that. You will not always be right.
No one bats 1,000." 27 Despite all the challenges, Chambers remained confident: "Our peers have shrunk by 43 percent, and we've grown by 2 percent. That's 45 points. It might be the most effective market share gain I've ever seen in a major industry in a 2-3 year period, never mind a one-year period. There will always be somebody who wants to be the next Cisco. We've had four generations of competitors, and we've won all four generations. The next Cisco will be Cisco." Chambers moved quickly once he realized his company was in a free fall, however. With extreme focus, he steered the company during the downturn by reaching out to others such as Jack Welch of GE and many other well-known CEOs. The company's overall strategic positioning remained the same. Chambers, who believed that external forces had led to the company's downfall, said: "We were doing a pretty good race, and then somebody changed the track. Everybody went off the road. That's what happened to our industry. We went off, too, but we did something different from anybody else. We analyzed whether our strategy was at fault, or if it was a change beyond our control. We determined that it was a change in the market."
29 Moreover, Chambers remained confident in Cisco's business strategy: "The network will evolve rapidly, and Cisco is uniquely positioned as the only company that can really evolve with the necessary speed. We have moved from a best-in-breed mentality, to an end-to-end architecture, to a network of networks, to intelligence in the network. Now we'll move to making the network the key platform of delivery of applications . . . everything goes into the network. It's not just data, voice, and video, and not just storage or telephony, but the whole concept of processing, data architecture, and implementation. I believe the network will become the platform for the future." 30 Despite Chambers' assertion that the company's overall strategy and strategic positioning remained the same, employees pointed out that Cisco began to develop a different business strategy to leverage the opportunities and constraints of a post-boom, more mature organization. According to Inder Sidhu, the overall strategy of the company shifted and needed to continue shifting from one that focused on "picking low hanging fruit" and focusing on box sales and revenue to more of a "customer-driven strategy," a focus on "catching and leveraging market transitions," and "developing a culture of stretch goals and thinking out of the box." Sidhu illustrated this by drawing a figure (see Figure 1) on his white board, describing Cisco's transition from getting the brand established (driving mind share) to sales coverage (driving market share) to the current need to grow revenues through customer intimacy (driving wallet share). "The existing challenge is to provide customers with great products, great service, and solutions that are tailored to their needs. In terms of human resource requirements, this market requires that Cisco attract, motivate, and retain great technical, business, and leadership talent and to develop these people over the course of their careers." Under the old regime, Sidhu observed that what Cisco needed was great technology. In the new environment, sales are also based on Cisco's ability to comprehensively solve their customer's technology-based business problems. This, he stated, required a stable, relationship-based sales process as well.
Randy Pond elaborated on Cisco's new strategy for the future, noting that it needed to include: a migration from a product-oriented organization into a systems-and-solutions organization; a drive to move down the food chain by purchasing Linksys, 31 a low-end consumer-level product; and driving productivity and efficiency through an increased focus on processes (for example, getting operating expenses below 35 percent). 32 In Pond's view, this boiled down to two key issues: driving productivity through processes like six sigma; and ensuring cross-functional alignment. Pond viewed leadership development as a "great facilitator of this," but also worried about confusing management training with developing the dynamic capabilities needed to meet Cisco's competitive challenges.
Moreover, as an immediate response to the financial downturn, Cisco laid off employees. Chambers cut his own salary to $1 in order to save jobs and he visited the company's outplacement center to boost employee morale. Chambers also gave back 2 million of the 6 million options he had been granted for the 
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period. The company gave six months' severance pay to the employees who were laid-off, contacted recruiters from other companies on their behalf, and helped employees who were foreign nationals to deal with immigration issues. Cisco treated such employees well in the hopes that these workers would return to Cisco when the company could hire them back. In fact, the company developed a creative program in which it agreed to pay employees one-third of their salary and continue their health benefits and stock-option grants if they agreed to work for a local charity or community organization. Approximately 80 employees accepted the offer.
All of these efforts to help its laid-off employees led to continued employee satisfaction and high marks from industry rating systems. In 2001, the company won third place on Fortune's list of the 100 best companies to work for in America (based on confidential interviews with employees) and by 2003, the company remained high on the list at 24th place, despite its layoffs, restructuring, and a drop in the stock price.
In addition to employee layoffs and compensation changes, Cisco reorganized in 2001. The company integrated routing and most of switching organizationally and began focusing more intensively on emerging markets. Chambers said: "Now we can share ideas from high-end routing with mid-level and lowend routing." 33 The idea was that marketers and engineers who had targeted different kinds of customers in the past would begin to work together. The changes, Chambers said, would eliminate the problem of having separate teams working on similar products or ideas. That, in turn, would help the company pitch a broad range of products to customers. "The customers were the ones saying, "Your products are overlapping. We'd like to see a better road map," he said. Internal assessments echoed such external perspectives. Company presentations stated that the old Cisco focused on growth and acquisitions, while the revised Cisco would focus on productivity and profitability. The old Cisco focused on entrepreneurialism with quick local development, while the revised Cisco would focus on senior leadership alignment on strategic direction. Thus productivity through process and cross-functional alignment were two big issues Cisco would begin to focus on after 2000. Certain elements of the old culture remained stronger than ever, such as focusing on customers and customer success.
Pond elaborated on the company's inefficiencies: "Cisco is suffering from 'DAN'-denial, arrogance, and nostalgia. We are truly dysfunctional. For example, I discovered 146 separate and uncoordinated quality efforts underway, 44 efforts focusing on the entitlement mentality, 16 investigating grey market problems, and 216 unique tracking tools in the company, all web-enabled. All of these were being done in the Cisco spirit of getting the job done, but we need better cross-function alignment." 36 Similarly, before the economic downturn, Cisco's 13,000 engineers who designed Cisco's products had 44 largely autonomous teams that worked on often-overlapping and sometimes competing projects. According to The Wall Street Journal: "Some groups built products for a narrow set of customers, such as cable television operators. Other teams built similar products for telephone companies. When Cisco fell behind rivals technologically, it would buy start-ups, even if an internal group was working on the same idea. Each team independently chose the components for its products, and frequently wrote its own software. By the summer of 2001, Cisco had eight different groups developing technology for transmitting telephone calls over computer networks." 37 In August 2001, Chambers consolidated the engineering group and focused on standardization and versatility. "We've rationalized the sins of the past seven years," said Bill Jennings, a chip designer at Cisco. "People are beginning to appreciate the value of sharing." 38 Chambers identified how Cisco planned to increase efficiencies: "This will mean dramatic changes in our one-year initiatives. We need to make cross-functional teamwork work effectively in our major market segments. We need to focus on taking the six areas of billion-dollar-plus opportunity and expanding them to $12 billion. We've got to be world-class in coming down the price/performance curve, passing our improved profit contribution through to our customers. We need to evolve our skills in a market that's going to move with tremendous speed, including 360-degree feedback for all managers and employees. And we need to really take on quality in systems and network architecture."
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A New "Build" HR Strategy: Developing Internal Talent
To support the new focus on productivity and cross-functional alignment, as well as the new strategic imperatives, Cisco's leaders felt the need to change from a "buy" talent strategy to a "build" talent strategy. The old Cisco focused on external recruitment and employee growth through acquisitions as a priority, while the new Cisco would focus more on motivating and developing internal talent, particularly leaders. The old Cisco focused on tools that were built to scale, while the new Cisco would build tools to enhance productivity and profit contribution. DCamp said: "Building deep bench strength requires us to re-look at our guiding principles, build supportive programs and processes, and match our people with the learning and supportive programs and processes our busi-ness offers. . . . We're returning to our roots-the original Cisco paradigm of rich development opportunities, but with the supporting programs and processes that make this possible in a large company. This requires a new mindset: sharing talent with others is more important than keeping a great team around you." 40 In a managers meeting, Chambers asked everyone, "How many of you think the company should add headcount this year?" No hands went up. Then he asked, "How many think your team needs more headcount?" Approximately 80 percent of the hands went up. "Therein lies the problem," he said. "We have to think more seamlessly and as an integrated whole." 41 Sidhu explained further: "We could no longer play the acquisition game and ramp up our direct sales force. In the past, Cisco sold mainly to technical decision makers. Today, sales are made to business decision makers based on the ability of our products to solve a business, not simply a technical, problem. Today, customers require new and more complex products and technology that are often built into systems that require them to interface with other equipment and software, and are high quality and reliable. Building, selling, and servicing these solutions requires people who are broader and deeper in their knowledge of business and more sophisticated technologically. These skills come both from having the technical background and from knowing a customer's business. This also means that Cisco managers must be able to cross-functionally coordinate and mobilize the pieces of Cisco needed to solve complex customer problems."
Chambers explained: "We made progress [in continued employee development], but in our industry, I want the majority of us not to be in the same job-or even the same function-three to five years from now. I want us to create an environment of continuous learning and challenge, that will allow us to move from one business unit to another in engineering, or from sales to customer advocacy, or from financial to IT." 42 In a company meeting, Chambers asked: "How many people think we're good at moving resources and retraining? (No hands). It's not even in our vocabulary. But we've got to get dramatically better at moving resources around the company. Our top leadership, most of them can't keep a job-I keep moving them around. We've got to learn how to retrain people effectively as part of our culture, to keep up with the market transitions." 43 In September 2001, Cisco took a first step to implement its "build" strategy; it created the Pathfinder software application that allowed managers to post openings for jobs within high-growth areas. Pathfinder's corresponding online database, I-Profiler, allowed employees to voluntarily enter their resumes for consideration. The profiles captured employees' work and educational experience, skills, and technical qualifications and detailed their career aspirations for development discussions with their managers. Line managers had access to each of their employees' profiles to better assess existing skills on their teams. Pathfinder was the first tool designed specifically to advertise job openings internally.
The Future and Challenges
By the end of 2003, financial analysts were skeptical that Cisco, without the ability to acquire talent, would be able to develop the bench strength needed to execute their new corporate strategy. There was even an acknowledgement of this challenge from within Cisco. Mike Campi, a Vice President of Human Resources, noted that at that time Cisco had "some pretty lousy leaders and a leadership development culture [was] not part of our DNA." Some senior line managers were also concerned that what was needed wasn't simply training but the ability to develop within senior managers the dynamic capabilities Cisco needed to transform itself and execute a completely new strategy."
Reflecting on her charge, Eckenrod acknowledged the daunting challenges she faced. Her predecessor put it bluntly; saying that if she tried to develop a leadership curriculum, "You'll never survive." Others in HR echoed this, noting that "a corporate training program won't happen." However, given the dire straits Cisco was in, the Board was supportive of the effort to develop the next generation of Cisco leaders. Eckenrod understood that what Cisco needed was not simply a conventional executive development program but an integrated HR effort that could build global talent, ensure the transition of the existing leaders, and provide people with the skills needed to change over their careers. Without a credible effort, Eckenrod knew that as the economy and Silicon Valley turned around, it would be difficult for Cisco to retain employees and to grow again. She also knew that she would have to overcome a great deal of skepticism and disagreement in Cisco's culture about exactly what leadership development entailed. In the intervening three years, Cisco had laid off almost 10,000 employees, written down over $2 billion in inventory, cut 20 percent of their product lines, and reduced their supplier base by 60 percent. These actions, and the recovering economy, had pushed their stock price up by more than 60 percent and, even though their revenues were below the peak of the bubble, Cisco's net income was at an all time high. Over this period, Cisco stock outperformed that of Dell, Microsoft, HP, and IBM. At the end of 2003, Cisco entered the low-end consumer home networking business by buying Linksys for $500 million. Cisco was also becoming a major supplier of telecommunications equipment, an estimated $750 billion market that they had not been in when the telecom crash ruined Lucent and Nortel.
In spite of these accomplishments, some skepticism remained about Cisco's future. Several industry experts doubted that Cisco equipment was reliable enough to meet rigorous telecom industry standards. Others, while acknowledging that Chambers and his team had accomplished a great deal in three years, still questioned his unbridled enthusiasm. One journalist wrote, "In a world where executives who under-promise and over-deliver are more in fashion, it may be a while before the rest of us are ready to join the party." 44 A key driver of the Cisco turnaround was their new human capital strategy. A company-wide team was chartered to develop a new approach to developing and leveraging Cisco talent. A central part of this was Chambers' evolving vision of a company-wide cross-functional effort to create a development culture executed through Cisco University. It was clear that Cisco University could not be like other corporate universities that were largely centralized training centers. "Cisco University is an initiative, not an organization. It is the way employees will prepare themselves for success in Cisco's future," commented Kate DCamp. Although the larger human capital strategy included a series of programs and leadership development approaches that were designed to further develop leaders at all levels of the company, the real key to the strategy was the University's ability to develop and promote five fundamental organizational capabilities: an agile workforce with knowledgeable employees who can move quickly to areas of highest need; a workforce that thrives on change; employees who understand customers and can deliver quality products and services; employees whose crossfunctional experiences improve their productivity and enhance their business acumen; and people throughout the organization who have strong capabilities in process.
The Cisco University umbrella was a cornerstone of Cisco's effort to reconceptualize the development of human capital within Cisco in three distinct ways or the "3E Model": experience through assignments, on-the-job learning, and traditional learning; exposure developed through online learning, mentoring, shadowing, periodic forums, and talent reviews; and education through a series of customized and focused programs that included significant teaching and involvement of senior Cisco executives as well as outside faculty. 45 In this way, Cisco University was to be the focal point for all career management and development, with linkages to feedback, job opportunities, coaching, training, and mentoring. The entire process would be designed to be employee-driven.
Making this happen would require a five-year effort involving not only curriculum design, but extensive efforts to link the various elements to Cisco's business strategy-and to do this while recognizing that their markets were constantly changing.
Performance Management and Development
To support its "build" HR focus, DCamp challenged Eckenrod to adapt the formal assessment and evaluation process. The general performance evaluation process, originally a 6-to 12-page form (depending on how much an individual would write about their own performance), was shortened to two pages, promoting more manager-employee dialogue. Performance feedback from others working with the employee was built into the automated performance management form (ePM). In addition, other development processes were introduced, such as the Talent Assessment Process (TAP), Leadership 360-degree Development Feedback (LDF), and Leadership Review Process (succession management).
The general Performance Management and Development process for employees was the "ongoing process of aligning individuals' goals with organizational initiatives, and then collecting and sharing feedback to continuously improve performance and support talent development." 46 During the ongoing review process, there were regularly scheduled events that provided a time to formally assess performance and develop plans for the future. The first included the Annual Performance Review and Development Plan, which reviewed individual key accomplishments in support of business initiatives and planned the next cycle of performance and development goals and deliverables. The process began when a manager and employee had an initial kickoff discussion. The employee then drafted a Performance Review and Development Plan and submitted the form to his or her manager. The manager then solicited input from others, and, after doing so, completed the Review and Plan, discussed the document with the employee, and finalized the review (Exhibit 5). Eckenrod explained further: "Our ePM system is individually driven, meaning that one individual's stretch goals might be different than another individual's stretch goals." In late 2003 through 2004, Cisco improved the ePM system to make the system more dynamic or "always open, always on." As employees shifted positions, changed, or added initiatives, the new system allowed them to update their initiatives, thereby allowing employees to have more ongoing dialogue with their managers. When employees moved jobs, they could update their initiatives to make them more relevant to their new roles. Eckenrod said: "The goal is for every employee to have a feedback and development discussion once a year, but the better managers use it more frequently." The ePM system was developed in 2000, but it was very "long and involved," according to Eckenrod. "We simplified the ePM process in 2003 and connected it to the 'G3 Model' or the expectations of Cisco Leaders to grow the business, grow our team, and grow yourself."
The second performance event was the Talent Assessment Process (TAP), launched in 2001, which evaluated an individual relative to workgroup peers on an expanded set of performance elements including individual achievement, versatility, productivity, alignment, and an organization-unique criterion. The TAP process was used to assess all employees at Cisco, both leaders and individual contributors. Eckenrod explained: "Unlike the ePM system, which looked at EXHIBIT 5. e-Performance Management one's individual performance, the TAP system identified the top employees from a knowledge or leadership perspective with an intent to accelerate those individuals, as well as enabling dialogue about development needs for the rest of the population." Prior to the launch of TAP, Cisco "was challenged to identify its best people," according to Eckenrod, due to the company's "egalitarian culture." The TAP process drove salary, stock, and bonuses but was only indirectly linked to the general Performance Management and Development process. Eckenrod elaborated: "One's performance management rating would automatically populate in TAP, but managers could update that, if someone's performance had recently changed, for example. Thus, there wasn't always a one-to-one correlation between one's ePM rating and the TAP rating." The TAP process occurred twice per year in Q2 and Q4. DCamp explained: "The purpose of TAP is to focus on our best performers and make sure they're getting the feedback they need to grow." 47 In addition, in 2001, Cisco implemented a succession management process called the Leadership Review Process. The Leadership Review Process allowed the company to identify the top 20 percent of its leaders, assess their progress, and evaluate future opportunities. The process was ongoing with a rollup to the Board 48 on an annual basis. Eckenrod commented on the integration of ePM and the Leadership Review Process: "We have a more integrated process now where applications like the Leadership Review Process utilize parts of the ePM system. Employees now fill out their personal history in the ePM system, or what we call their eProfile, and the Leadership Review Process utilizes this information, along with their development plan from ePM. We'll have one set of employee experience and performance data that has a multiplicity of uses and will be integrated into multiple processes." The Leadership Review Process also integrated the G3 criteria.
Launched in the spring of 2002, the Leadership Development Feedback (LDF) was a customized 360-degree process specifically for managers. It was designed to provide Cisco managers with a feedback report from the people they worked with-their team, peers, manager, and others. The LDF process targeted managers with three or more direct reports and was manager-focused, while TAP focused on the entire employee population. LDF helped Cisco managers gain insight into their strengths and development needs so they could improve their leadership effectiveness. Leaders received feedback on a standard set of questions based on the G3 Model. Some ratings included: "creates opportunities for top talent to get exposure to senior leadership," "builds collaboration and partnerships within and outside of his/her group," "actively coaches employees to improve their performance," "places Cisco's success above personal gain," "treats employees with fairness and respect; role models Cisco's culture and values," "acts in the best interests of customers," and "builds leadership depth within Cisco." The report quantitatively compared the manager's response to various constituents such as the average, peers, direct reports, others, and manager. Respondents were also asked to answer qualitative questions such as, "what one or two things do you view as key strengths of this person that he/she should continue to perform?" "What one or two things do you view as key developmental areas this person should address?" And "what feedback do you have on this person's teamwork and collaboration skills, either within his/her team or across functions?" 49 The LDF process was launched with the company's first volunteer, CEO John Chambers, who implemented it with the entire senior leadership team.
After several years of cutting-edge automated HR "tools," Cisco's focus began shifting in late 2003 to integrating processes and expanding its perspective on development. Cisco's performance management process, ePM, was simplified to encourage more dialogue between the manager and employee about career aspirations and development. By July 2004, all Cisco businesses and functions had adopted relative employee assessment in their management reviews and TAP was no longer required as a formal process, but managers had internalized the need to make such relative comparisons. Instead, a broad company-wide Talent Review process, which allowed for discussion of emerging people and technology leaders from the individual contributor to manager levels was under development to replace the TAP system. Senior leadership strongly supported the need for fewer more simplified and integrated HR tools. Eckenrod firmly believed that "technology enables but should not take the place of manageremployee dialogue."
Executive Leadership Development
Leadership development was slated to facilitate Cisco's focus on productivity and cross-functional alignment. Randy Pond, Senior Vice President, Operations, Systems, and Processes said: "Leadership development prior to 2000 was spotty at best. It was mostly left up to the individual and third parties; for example, we sent some people to Harvard Business School. The economic downturn gave us the intellectual bandwidth to focus on leadership and not just the business. John Chambers decided that when we came out on the other side, we would come out as strong as possible." Chambers explained the shift to a "development" culture during the 2002 quarterly meeting when he said: "We have to believe that it's more important to be an influence leader, to be focused on the customer, and to work across functions effectively, than it is to be a superstar at one function." 50 Pond agreed: "During the lull period, we had to drive productivity through process, adopt process as business skill, and align ourselves functionally." Thus, after the economic downturn Cisco's leaders were expected to "grow the business, grow our team, and grow yourself," adhering to the "Grow 3" model ("G3"). Elements of "grow the business" included customer success, focused on profitability/productivity, and business knowledge. Elements of "grow our team" included teamwork and collaboration, vision and alignment, leading change, and building talent. Finally, elements of "grow yourself" included integrity, judgment and perspective, continuous learning, communication and influence, and adaptability.
As noted, Cisco adopted the "3E Model" development framework in late 2002 and early 2003. The balance was 70 percent experience, 20 percent exposure, and 10 percent education. Education consisted of instructor-led courses, e-learning programs, and readings. Experience included on-the-job tasks and special projects, job changes and rotations, and special assignments. Finally, exposure included feedback, role models, visibility opportunities, coaching, and mentoring. Cisco regularly looked externally for such concepts as the 3E model: "Our job is to bring the outside in," commented Eckenrod. "We base the "3E" percentages on external research that explains how people learn. This drives our belief that real people learn through experience, not just classroom training."
Executive Coaching
In late 2002, Cisco's HR group also launched "Executive Coaching." The goal of Executive Coaching was to "accelerate development of high-potential directors and vice presidents based on the expectations of Cisco leaders." The Executive Coaching model consisted of a coaching team that included the executive being coached, an external coach, the executive's manager, and their HR leader. The manager and external coach partnered to help the executive maximize his or her strengths, identify gaps, and align development to those findings. The process involved determining if an executive would benefit from coaching, launching the process if appropriate, gathering assessment data on the executive, conducting coaching sessions, observing leadership behaviors, providing feedback, and measuring results. An external, global coaching partner was identified whose coaches used a common methodology, Cisco's LDF 360-degree feedback data, and the G3 Leadership framework criteria.
Taking advantage of this coaching program, the information technology function initiated, with members of Eckenrod's team, a customized leadership development effort that was called the "Learning Cohort Program." It provided a mechanism for small groups of high-potential IT leaders (6 to 8) to work together on common developmental needs, utilizing a combination of internal and external coaches, a Cisco sponsor, and peer coaching. Cohort team members met monthly as a group that was facilitated by a Cisco mentor and external executive coach. Eckenrod offered her perspective on the goals and design of the programs: "All four programs are more focused on development for the future rather than "training" for specific skills. The content is dynamic in that we regularly match faculty with executives so that we are reflecting current business challenges in the content. Cases and simulations are customized to simulate current and future challenges and opportunities." A team of faculty including academics, leadership development consultants (external and internal), and senior Cisco leaders, conducted the programs. Eckenrod's goal was for "the core design of the CLS to bring the external perspective in to our talent." All participants of CLS had to be nominated by the Leadership Review Process by their business or functional area and had to be considered to have significant future growth opportunities within Cisco in order to attend one of the four sessions. More specifically, participants who attended CLS programs were nominated as part of their Leadership Review. As individuals were reviewed for management promotion, their CLS participation was one factor that was considered. Every program included participants from a mix of regions, functions, and businesses, and space was allotted proportionally to the number of managers in each business or function, with Engineering and Sales having the highest number of participants to date.
The Cisco Leadership Series
Chambers felt strongly about executive involvement being a critical component of the CLS. Eckenrod commented on the early challenges, however: "Initially we did struggle for executive involvement and sponsorship, but this changed quickly after the first one or two program offerings of ELP and BLP. Now, some of the executives meet with faculty regularly, some teach in one or more of the programs, some come and spend time in dialogue with the groups and finally, some executives are group mentors with participants." Further, each of the four programs had a designated executive sponsor who reviewed all of the program content and evaluations with the CLS staff regularly. Eckenrod stated that a few executives were extremely involved in the CLS: "In some cases, such as Randy Pond, the ELP executive sponsor and Brad Boston, Senior Vice President of Information Technology and sponsor of SLP, actually attend significant, if not all, portions of the programs to ensure strategic alignment and understand the challenges facing our top talent and gain exposure to faculty." The executive sponsors have included a Senior Vice President of Operations, Systems, and Processes for ELP, a Vice President of Corporate Positioning for SLP, a Senior Vice President of Marketing for BLP sponsor, and a Vice President of Finance for EmLP. These members plus a Senior Vice President of World Wide Field Operations made up the CLS advisory council.
Once Eckenrod secured executive participation in the CLS, however, other challenges emerged: "The first year's programs highlighted several consistent challenges, especially the need for a more clearly articulated strategy. None of our executive speakers articulated the company-wide strategic initiatives in the same way. This made it difficult to customize some of the curriculum with faculty, resulting in more generic discussions than we desired. However, with the involvement of our executive sponsors, John Chambers and his Senior team 
Cisco University
The premise underlying Cisco University, launched in 2003, was to give Cisco the ability to develop versatile and adaptable employees, such as enabling an optics engineer to transition to a voice-over-internet-protocol engineer. The rationale was to create "knowledgeable employees who can move quickly to areas of highest need, [a] workforce that thrives on change." 51 It would also be 
EXHIBIT 6 Descriptions of the Cisco Leadership Programs
The Executive Leader Program (ELP)
ELP targeted high-performance Vice Presidents and accepted 35-40 participants for each session.The program objective was,"to drive sustainable competitive advantage through expanded global perspective and collaboration. " a It consisted of a two-week program spread over a two-month period. One week was held in the U.S. and the other week was held in Europe. ELP participants typically had significant global responsibilities and roles that crossed business units. Faculty were brought in from top universities across the globe to facilitate the sessions, and senior Cisco executives facilitated key sections of the program to provide participants with a Cisco perspective.Topics included strategic global thinking and cross functional perspectives, building shared thinking around issues in key leadership areas, and exploring leadership challenges and dilemmas in complex global environments. Many of the ELP participants joined teams to address business-focused problems. By June 2004, ELP had been offered three times and included 98 participants.
The Strategic Leader Program (SLP)
SLP targeted senior directors and included 35-40 participants per session.The program objective was "to build agile, cross-functional leaders with strategic perspective. "
b It consisted of a three and one-half day residential program followed by two half-day virtual sessions over three months.The virtual sessions were led by Cisco senior executives and external business thought leaders. Participants also benefited from executive mentors. By July 2004, SLP had been offered three times to 105 senior directors. a way of avoiding large-scale employee layoffs. Mike Campi, a new member of the HR team after over five years in manufacturing and supplier management at Cisco, said: "We need to anticipate market shifts and have the right skill sets to meet changed demands." Pond explained further: "Cisco University is the dynamic engine that creates and deploys a curriculum that avoids layoffs by retraining and redeploying people. We need dynamic capabilities and process innovation, not training. Cisco could simply lay off those that aren't core employees, but we don't want to do this." DCamp provided background: "We used to have 19 training organizations at Cisco, mostly focused on product, technical, and customer training. There was a lot of overlap. I/T had its own training organization, as did HR, Finance, etc. We started Cisco University to establish a common platform and access portal for all of our e-learning and development options. Eventually, the concept grew to become a single access point for employees to find out anything related to the 3E's."
Cisco University would be a learning network that would transform the way Cisco employees work and learn, creating a stimulating development environment to follow business opportunities. 52 Cisco University was "an initiative, not an organization, a company-wide, cross-functional effort that embraces all The timeline for developing Cisco University spanned from 2003, when the Cisco University vision and strategy were developed, to FY 2004 when resources would be available to all employees including development planning and links to functional areas of focus, to FY 2005 when the core content for the 3E's would be in place to enable personalized career development, and finally to FY 2006 when Cisco University would be the global source for all employee career development planning and activities. Chambers' goal for Cisco University was to have 90 to 95 percent of educational content "e-enabled." Eckenrod commented: "The only company that has come close to this statistic is IBM. John Chambers drives for productivity improvement and envisions e-learning as an enabler of greater productivity. The challenges are whether Cisco can embrace learning in this manner. Technical content lends itself quite readily to e-learning, but the challenge will be in helping managers develop people management skills, with experience and exposure a complementary part of the learning foundation."
Perspectives on New Leadership Efforts
Mohsen Moazami, Vice President Internet Business Solutions Group, commented on the benefits of programs such as the Executive Leadership Program (ELP): "ELP was one of the most effective training programs I have been exposed to since my days at Stanford. It helped us hold intelligent conversations about strategy and its implications for Cisco. All graduates develop a common vocabulary that further facilitates internal communication. In addition, ELP is a new way of building an extensive internal network of friends. Prior to 2000, we were in the mode of high velocity and entrepreneurialism. After attending ELP, I learned how to slow down and to think things through. Cisco is definitely good at technical education and financial management education, but we're still less disciplined at leadership. We also rely too heavily on online tools. Leadership development needs more of a human touch. Our tendency is to focus on tools. The leadership development effort has gone from an entrepreneurial start-up to a bunch of HR deliverables. The effort might be too programmatic now." Gary Bridge, Vice President and Global Lead of the Internet Business Solutions Group, said: "The content in ELP was useful, especially given that most people attending had never really thought about strategy at the higher level. During the session, we assessed competitors and what they were doing, which was very helpful because we generally only focus on what Cisco could do better, not what competitors are doing." Mike Campi, a Vice President of Human Resources, emphasized the importance of developing a common vocabulary through such leadership programs: "Our existing leadership programs are helping us to develop a common vocabulary, terminology, and set of frameworks and tools. We're not entirely there yet, but we're heading in the right direction."
Inder Sidhu, Vice President of Worldwide Strategy worried that Cisco's focus on leadership development could change if Cisco's growth took off again: "People who are stretched don't have much time for development," he said. Campi disagreed, however: "When the market picks up, our emphasis on leadership development will continue because of John [Chambers]. There's both a strategic and cultural commitment to this."
Next Steps: Performance Measurement
Eckenrod said: "Now that we have established many of the strategies and programs, development measurement is our next focus." A section on career development was included in the company's "Pulse Survey," Cisco's annual employee commitment and alignment survey. In terms of the Leadership Review Process, Eckenrod said: "We measure our progress by looking at whether the people who were discussed three years ago are being tracked and are moving successfully within the company. We're looking at the mix of our leadership talent and the development of individuals in our pipeline. We're getting better at this process because we see different people being identified and discussed now than were in our initial dialogue three years ago. We're improving our assessment skills and are learning to focus on specific development outcomes."
For the Cisco Leadership Series, especially for ELP and SLP, Eckenrod and her team surveyed prior participants to determine what tools, strategies, or tactics they have utilized in their working environment. "Many of our participants, for example, use an investment portfolio approach to assessing innovation in their work environment, which they learned in one of our sessions," she said. All participants for the Cisco Leadership Series evaluated their experience in each course. Eckenrod also measured performance of the Cisco Leadership Series by the increased demand from employees and Cisco leadership involvement through design assistance of the programs. "We're in the process of shifting the cost of these programs to the businesses because we are seeing the demand for our programs and we want the businesses to 'own' these programs," she said.
The Future
In 2004, Chambers and the Board reflected on Cisco's development progress since 2001. In that time period, a series of leadership programs and leadership development approaches were designed to further develop leaders at all levels of the company, and work to integrate these efforts under the Cisco University umbrella was well underway. Eckenrod and DCamp knew that that they were heading in the right direction when, in October 2003, CEO Magazine ranked Cisco as number 13 on its "Top 20 Companies for Leaders" list. This recognition was a combined result of a number of the leadership initiatives that Cisco had launched since 2001.
Despite these key successes, however, Eckenrod and her team wondered if they had put in place the most effective leadership development strategy to meet Cisco's continuing changing environment in the future. More specifically, Eckenrod wondered how Cisco's leadership development strategy and process compared to those of other high-performing organizations, how Cisco's senior executives should be involved in the future in the company's leadership development efforts, how to measure the effectiveness of such efforts, and finally, she wondered whether these leadership development efforts would be sustainable in an economic upturn.
Notes
